Getting Back to the Multi-layered Approach to Cargo Container Security

Torry Shealy and Eric Dobson

July 8, 2009

The supply chain is a critical linkage for the globalized economy, but it remains a clear and vulnerable vector for terrorism, theft, and illegal activities domestically, as well as into and out of the country. The supply chain and the facilities that manage it are a loose sieve and are plagued with problems of security. Fear of terrorists using a container to smuggle a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), coupled with the realities of rising cargo theft, the smuggling of illegal drugs and products into a country and smuggling weapons, money and stolen goods out of a country have raised concerns globally about cargo security.

A potential threat to homeland security at our ports comes from the millions of shipping containers flowing into the country every year. These containers are the Achilles heel in our security efforts to defend against terrorism. The consequences of an attack on a US port could cause a major loss of life and severe structural destruction, as well as grave economic damage to the United States . In the aftermath of September 11 th , the U.S. economy was nearly brought to its knees by the sudden blockade of goods and people at its borders and ports.1

In the event of a successful terrorist attack on a domestic or allied port, the U.S. economy would be devastated due to the shutdown of all U.S. ports. The consequences can be seen in the 2002 Labor Strike which cost the US economy $10 billion.2 In a case study done by the Brookings Institution, the estimated cost of a detonation of a WMD hidden in a shipping container would cost the US economy $1 trillion.3 The added costs to the global economy would be far worse. Our ports are an economic lifeline in the globalized economy of today. The results of such an event would be catastrophic on a global scale.

To address this issue the US government has instituted the Container Security Initiative (CSI) to expand inspections overseas. Under CSI , US Customs and Border Patrol (CBP) instituted a “24-hour” rule that requires a container's manifest be submitted to CBP 24 hours before it is loaded on a ship. CBP then uses rules-based software to evaluate the container and its contents to determine if it is high-risk and should be either inspected non-intrusively (scanning) or be physically inspected.

Unfortunately, this system is based scanning and inspecting only the high-risk containers, which CBP says is about 5%. The US Congress has passed a law requiring that 100% of cargo bound for the United States from foreign ports be scanned overseas for radioactive materials,. The Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano has said that US Customs and Border Patrol would not be able to meet the 2012 deadline set by Congress. With limited resources and a desire not to hurt commerce, a multi-layered approach to the detection of illicit materials and substances should be used.

In a report from The University of Pennsylvania, Nitin Bakshi, Stephen E. Flynn and Noah Gans advocate using a “industry-centric” system established by the Safe Freight Initiative (SFI) over that of a the present Container Security Initiative process for inspecting 100% of containers bound for the US. Bakshi, et al. state that if customs officials use the present scanning system that is based on only scanning high-risk containers it will create a back-log of containers waiting to get scanned and therefore inhibit commerce. The University of Pennsylvania report states that by using the approach developed by SFI, high-risk containers can still be scanned and undergo extra scrutiny while lower-risk containers can be scanned by drive-through portals. Containers that then trigger an alarm at the drive-through portal will then be sent to the other scanner and possibly be physically inspected. In this way, scanning containers at foreign ports would not hinder commerce and allow customs officials to meet their mandate while curbing costs. This is a similar two-step approach to the way cargo is scanned at border crossings and US ports.

Portal scanners are a very important part of the multi-layered approach but they do have their limitations. Currently at most ports and border crossings, most cargo screening for radioactive material involves a two part screening process.

“When entering the United States , cargo conveyances, such as trucks, are to pass through a radiation detection portal. This process is called primary screening. If radiation is present, a CBP officer is to be alerted. The conveyance is to be directed to a second radiation detection portal, which confirms the presence of radiation and where additional equipment can be used to identify the origin of the radiation and determine whether it comes from a potential threat. This process is called secondary screening. Consequently, the current approach to radiation detection at the border is based on a two-step process using different types of equipment.”4, 5

The Department of Homeland Security has also set out to deploy Advanced Spectroscopic Portal monitors (ASP) that are supposed to not only detect radioactive material but identify it as well to reduce the false alarms that occur in the present two-step process. Yet there has been much criticism about the newer technology. The US Government Accounting Office (GAO) report criticized that the evaluation of the ASPs was flawed and that ASP is not an improvement over the current portal scanners now in use.

Another criticism is that none of the portals are efficient in detecting radioactive material. (ABC News has twice smuggled depleted uranium into the country aboard containers that were targeted as high-risk and were sent through detection portals.) There is one more issue with the detection portals used by customs officials, they do not detect biological, chemical, or explosive agents. This is a critical area of need. While there are other scanning technologies that can be developed to better detect nuclear material, it may take many more years to get this technology in place for customs use and it may be at a higher cost.

Another avenue to take in addressing this issue should be to place sensors on the inside of the container. There are many types of miniaturized sensors either on the market or in development that could be put into a sensor package to detect illicit material. The Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Semiconductor Detector Group is developing semiconductor-based radiation detectors. The detectors convert the “energy of absorbed photons or charged particles into electrical signals that provide a measure of each particle's energy.”6 (See http://sensors.lbl.gov/s_nuclear.html ) There are also miniaturized, low-power silicon chips being developed to detect neutrons. There are micro-sensors in airport ventilation systems that detect explosives. There is the so called Dog-On-A-Chip technology that can detect narcotics. There is even talk of putting nuclear sensors in cell phones to create a detection network. If sensors can be used in these applications, they surly can be ruggedized, put together into a sensor package and be used on the interior of a container. And wouldn't it make sense that a sensor on the inside of the container would have a better ability to detect what is on the inside of the container than a portal would from the outside . This would provide for the best non-intrusive detection as well as being able to sense not only radioactive material but also chemical and explosive materials.

As seen above, sensing capability inside the container would give great advantages to customs officials. For industry, sensor packages also have their advantages. Temperature, light, humidity, even spoilage can all be detected with sensors. Also, RFID sensors in the container can be used for automated inventory down to the SKU level, which would benefit just-in-time inventories.

Two other concerns that should be addressed for intelligence purposes are controlling the custody and entry into containers. Containers are often misplaced or lost, sometimes ending up in someone else's holding yard. This in itself can represent a security issue especially in foreign countries. There can also be entry issues at the factory or in transit. Entry into the containers should be limited to loading and unloading at the origin and destination. Even entry into idle containers should be controlled.

Containers in transit, especially on roadways, are vulnerable to unauthorized entry. This is seen in the United States at a growing rate with the issue of cargo theft. Often cargos are targeted for theft at truck stops and efficient thieves can unload cargos within minutes. Truck drivers in other countries also take breaks along the roads and an efficient terrorists, with relative ease, could introduce a weapon into a container, along a road in a foreign country, where perhaps law enforcement is not as strong.

Both industry and Homeland Security benefit by controlling the custody of and entry into shipping containers. With a reliable seal/lock and global tracking/data device, both custody and entry issues of the shipping container become significantly mitigated. Homeland Security benefits by being able to reliably see where the container has been, who has had custody, and when it has been entered. This information should not only come from the shipper through compliance with the 24-hour rule but also be accessible through the tracking device on the container in real-time. For example, a container with a tracking/data device with global capability should be able to send out custody and entry data to CBP's National Targeting Center in Virginia . This would give customs officials a much more reliable data in which to decide which containers to target.

Industry also benefits by first, being able to better utilize containers and preventing them from being lost and out of service. Second, industry benefits because in reduction in theft and tampering. Third, with supplying more reliable custody and entry information to customs officials, industry would see a reduction in inspection and inspection related costs.

There are many different solutions being marketed for container security. Most containers are sealed with either C-TPAT approved ISO 17712 bolt or cable seals which can be easily defeated. There are also locking bars which attach to both retaining bars of the container doors. These bars are tamper evident but it is only evident sometime after its been tampered with and gives no real-time alert as to when the tampering takes place. There are also many tracking devices on the market, but these only alert that a breach is taking place and provide no physical security. With the efficiency at which many cargo thieves operate, even if an alert is sent out, the thieves could have taken all the contents of the container before first-responders arrive.

If the three elements of a reliable seal/lock, a global tracking/data device, and an interior sensor package are used together, there could be much bigger benefits for both industry and Homeland Security. Only one technology on the market can combine all three of these elements into one solution, the TrakLok Corporation (TrakLok) of Knoxville, TN. TrakLok is deploying the GeoLok TM , a device that quickly and easily provides for physical security for cargoes, while giving the client global asset visibility. TrakLok is commercializing this device and TrakLog TM web-portal as a complete solution to secure and globally track shipping containers for companies shipping high value, high interest, and hazardous materials.  This solution provides real-time information about the condition and location of cargo and high value assets while only the right person at the right time in the right place can gain access to the container.  TrakLok directly provides value to all points of pain in the global supply chain by dramatically increasing the security of containers while maximizing the efficiency of their custody, entry, movement and storage. By employing TrakLok's patented technology in a multi-layered security approach, cargoes can be better protected against tampering, ensure custody, and detect what is on the inside of a container.

In a multi-layered approach, The combination of the CSI/SFI “industry-centric” approach to portal scanning coupled with container locking/tracking/sensing solution would give customs officials a clear advantage in inspections they never had before. As well there are incentives for industry to adopt that go beyond the security benefits at no government expenditure. Adopting this multi-layered approach is not about cost/benefit it is about return on investment which drives industry to adopt rather than just comply.

1. Campbell, Tanner and Rohan Gunaratna. “Maritime Terrorism, Piracy, and Crime.” In Rohan Gunaratna, ed Terrorism in the Asia-Pacific: Threat and Response. Times Media Private Limited. Singapore . 2003. p. 71.

2. Baer, Martha, Katerina Heron, Oliver Morton, and Evan Ratliff. Safe: The Race to Protect Ourselves in a Newly Dangerous World. Harper-Collins Publishers. New York . 2005. p. 248

3. Ibid.

4. Campbell and Gunaratna. p. 73-4.

5. Shea, Dana A., John D. Moteff and Daniel Morgan. The Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Program: Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. Washington, Dc. March 25, 2009 .

6.. Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory Semiconductor Detector Group. “Nuclear Radiation Sensors.” Industrial Innovations. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory. Viewed on July 5, 2009 at: http://sensors.lbl.gov/s_nuclear.html