Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive Threats
Nuclear Threats
A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Materials
Citation: Phillips, Gary W., David J. Nagel, and Timothy Coffey. “A Primer on the Detection of Nuclear and Radiological Materials.” Center for Technology and National Security Policy. National Defense University . Washington , DC . May, 2005. http://stinet.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA436197&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf
Abstract: The study upon which this report is based was undertaken because of the large and growing importance of detection technologies for NRWMD. While this report will focus on detection of NRWMD, the NRWMD problem does not have a purely technical solution. The reasons for this will become clear in this report. Detectors are necessary but not sufficient for dealing with this problem. This report seeks to be pragmatically comprehensive in its coverage. It takes a level intermediate between policy, on one hand, and technology details, on the other hand. The goal is to provide part of the basis for “higher level” policy considerations, as well as a framework for “lower level,” more detailed technical concerns. Readers of this report are expected to fall into a few classes. They include policymakers, managers responsible for implementing policies and putting in place the combinations of technologies and people for effective and timely detection of NRWMD materials and devices, users of the technologies, technology developers, and students. This report presents the fundamentals of detection technologies and insights into the current and coming state-of-the-art in such technologies. As such, it should be of use to most of these readers. Researchers involved in developing new technologies will not find the latest details of their field documented in this report, since this is not a scientific review article. However, researchers might find this overview of the technologies of interest.
Citation: Daly, Sara, John Parachini, and William Rosenau. “Aum Shinrikyo, Al Qaeda, and the Kinshasa Reactor: Implications of Three Case Studies for Combating Terrorism.” RAND . Santa Monica , CA. 2005.
Abstract: To provide an empirical basis for policymaking, this documented briefing explores attempts by non-state actors to acquire nuclear materials and to fabricate nuclear systems. Three cases were selected for analysis. Although other terrorist groups in the past have shown interest in acquiring nuclear materials and devices, the two groups examined in this study, Aum Shinrikyo and al Qaeda, have demonstrated a commitment unmatched by other organizations. In addition, a substantial body of open-source material was available, although some of it was unreliable and contradictory, making absolute judgments impossible. The case of the disappearance of nuclear fuel rods from a reactor in Zaire illustrates what might be termed the “supply side” of the nuclear market and illustrates the pathways that terrorists or criminals might follow to obtain nuclear material. As with the two other cases explored here, open source material was available, although in many instances this information provided only a fragmentary and tentative account.
Detecting Nuclear Material in International Container Shipping: Criteria for Secure Systems
Citation: Chiu, Sam, Sid Drell, Bill Dunlop, Steve Flynn, Zack Haldeman, John Harvey, Tom Karzas, Michael Levi, Howard Lowdermilk, Michael May, Rob Nelson, Vic Orphan, Pief Panofsky, Tonya Putnam, Phil Stroud, and Dean Wilkening. Michael May, Tonya Putnam, and Dean Wilkening. “Detecting Nuclear Material in International Container Shipping: Criteria for Secure Systems.” Stanford Study Group.Center for International Security And Cooperation. Stanford University . Stanford, CA. August, 2002.
Abstract: This paper presents the results of a summer study conducted at Stanford University that examined how existing technology and resources can be applied most effectively to prevent the transport, by means of international commercial shipping, of illicit nuclear materials for use in terrorist activities.2 The focus of this effort was on the detection of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials (SNM), as well as detecting forms of radioactive material that could be used in other types of terrorist attacks, including radiological dispersal devices (“dirty bombs”). Issues associated with the illicit transport and import of chemical and biological weapons agents for use in terrorist activity, while extremely important and in many ways more difficult to deal with, are not considered here. The objective of this study was to assist ongoing efforts inside the government and in the private sector to remedy obvious security vulnerabilities in the international maritime shipping system. This system as it exists today has been designed for speed and efficiency—not security. A nuclear terrorist act against a major port would have extremely grave economic, political, and human consequences that would extend far beyond the port or country of attack, and could temporarily paralyze the international trading system.
Thinking about the Unthinkable: Economic Consequences of a Nuclear Attack
Citation: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. “Thinking about the Unthinkable: Economic Consequences of a Nuclear Attack.” Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. US Department of Energy. Richland , WA . January 27, 2006 . http://environment.pnl.gov/accompprodline/prodline_detail.asp?id=540
Abstract: An article from PNL about scenarios performed to predict the economic consequences of a nuclear attack on US cities.
Responding to the Unthinkable: Nuclear Weapons Detonation in the Homeland
Citation: Kievit, James and Jeff McNary. “Responding to the Unthinkable: Nuclear Weapons Detonation in the Homeland.” CSL Issue Paper Volume 13-04. Center for Strategic Leadership. US Army War College . Carlisle , PA. October, 2004. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/Publications/13-04.pdf#search='responding%20to%20the%20unthinkable%20war%20college '
Abstract: Every day an already challenging security environment grows even more daunting with the continued proliferation of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosive (CBRNE) capabilities throughout the world. Each can create clandestine devices for delivery by state-sponsored or non-state terrorists. Thus, in the future, perhaps the not so distant future, American political and military leadership actually may have to respond to “the unthinkable”: a successful weapon of mass destruction (WMD) attack by terrorists within the borders of the nation. With that possibility in mind, the United States Army War College (USAWC) recently conducted a focused workshop bringing together over 100 participants from local, regional, state and federal entities at the Center for Strategic Leadership on Carlisle Barracks to review contemporary plans, policies and procedures and discuss developing programs to incorporate military, and especially reserve component (RC) forces into the responses to a hypothetical CBRNE attack within the borders of the United States. Three different attack scenarios were presented – one biological, one radiological, and one nuclear. This paper addresses the workshop's findings related to response to a nuclear weapon attack.
Responding to the Unthinkable: Roles of the Military
Citation: Jeff McNary. “Responding to the Unthinkable: Roles of the Military.” CSL Issue Paper Volume 02-05. Center for Strategic Leadership. US Army War College . Carlisle , PA. November, 2004.
Abstract: The Third Annual USAWC Reserve Component Workshop was held 28 – 30 September 2004 at the Collins Center , Carlisle Barracks Pennsylvania. This report details the roles of the military in response to Biological, Nuclear and Radiological attacks on the US homeland.
Detector Requirements to Curb Nuclear Smuggling
Citation: CN Smuggling llnl.gov November 14, 2001
Nuclear Smuggling Chains: Suppliers, Intermediaries, and End-Users
Citation: L Zaitseva, K Hand American Behavioral Scientist, 2003.
Nuclear Smuggling , Rogue States and Terrorists
Citation: R Lee - THE CHINA AND EURASIA FORUM QUARTERLY.May, 2006.
US Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning.
Citation: GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. WASHINGTON DC. 2002.
Radiological Threats
Rapid Risk Assessment: FY05 Annual Summary Report; Laboratory Directed Research and Development.
Citation: Whelan, G., W. D. Millard, G. M. Gelston, M. A. Pelton, Z. Yang, D. L. Strenge, C. Lee, C. Sivaraman,M. J. Simpson, J. K. Young, T. P Khangaonkar, T. R. Downing, B. L. Hoopes, L. E. Hachmeister. “Rapid Risk Assessment: FY05 Annual Summary Report; Laboratory Directed Research and Development.” Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. US Department of Energy. Richland , WA . March, 2006. http://www.pnl.gov/main/publications/external/technical_reports/PNNL-15697.pdf#search=%22Rapid%20Risk%20Assessment%3A%20FY05%20Annual%20Summary%20Report%3B%20Laboratory%20Directed%20Research%20and%20Development%20 Pacific%20Northwest%20National%20Laboratory%22
Abstract : The Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL) is developing decision support tools that will assist in the transition of incident information into Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) that are understandable and can be executed in a real-world, operational environment. A natural event, man-made accident, or terrorist-initiated incident can have many effects on a local or regional site. A single chemical release can impact a site through multiple direct and indirect transfer mechanisms, including airborne dispersion, surface contact, groundwater, surface water, food ingestion, etc. Multiple events/incidents are even more difficult to characterize, assess, and transition into meaningful PARs. During emergencies, responders must rapidly assess risks and decide on the best course of action—all within minutes to hours. PNNL is blending existing modeling and decision support technology to develop new methods for transitioning science-based threat assessment to protective-action recommendations. The rapid risk assessment tool will be both understandable and applicable to the emergency management community and would be a valuable tool during any water security-related incident.
Citation: Mottley, Robert, Chris Gillis, and Mark McHugh. “Palermo Senator: Feat of Clay.” American Shipper. Vol 44; Part 10, October, 2002. http://www.americanshipper.com/paid/OCT02/toc_OCT_02_html.asp
Abstract: No simulation consultant could have put together a more daunting scenario than the one just played out in New York harbor, in which government agents scrambled to determine if radiation detected on the Palermo Senator posed a public threat. Clay tiles ended up being the suspect cargo.
Beyond Border Control
Citation: SE Flynn. Foreign Affairs, 2000.
Explosives Threats
Iran and the Palestinian War Against Israel: Implications of the Karine-A Affair
Citation: M Rubin, PA Smuggling. dushkin.com February 26, 2002.
Screening system for objects in transit
Citation: G Koren, S Dolev. 2005.
Threat Localization in QR Explosive Detection Systems
Citation: H Robert, PJ Prado. APPLIED MAGNETIC RESONANCE, 2004.
Explosive detection screening system
Citation: CD Corrigan, LV Haley. US Patent 5,109,691, 1992.
Chemical Threats
Beyond Border Control
Citation:SE Flynn. Foreign Affairs, 2000
Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons
Citation: AE Smithson, HLS Center. 1999
Biological Threats
Beyond Border Control
Citation: SE Flynn. Foreign Affairs, 2000.
Toxic Archipelago: Preventing Proliferation from the Former Soviet Chemical and Biological Weapons
Citation: AE Smithson, HLS Center. 1999.
The Changing Proliferation Threat
Citation: JF Sopko. Foreign Policy, 1996.